The article presents a critical review of the contemporary methods of measuring presidential power in political science. 
Introduction
A few years ago, it had never occurred to anyone to measure forms of government. However, in recent years, political scientists have widely adopted an index analysis of presidential power, and there are now several methods of measuring presidential power that allow to imagine numerically not only the power of actors, but also the nature of the form of government.
What is the significance of the measurement of presidential power? In answering this, it is first necessary to gain knowledge about the volume of presidential powers in different countries, which allows us to compare the "strength" and "weakness" of the presidential and parliamentary authority. In particular, we can empirically confirm or refute the common idea of the super-strong power of the president ("superpresidentialism") in, for example, countries of the former Soviet Union (Zaznaev, 2014, p. 197) and Eastern and Central Europe. In addition, a quantitative method may help researchers to suggest options for political reform in these states.
Second, as M.S. Shugart and J. Carey (1992) convincingly showed by skilfully combining quantitative and qualitative research, measuring presidential power allows us to develop a comprehensive typology of regimes (pp. 158-160) , and to draw clear boundaries between presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, and other types.
Third, the index of presidential power opens up opportunities for further implementation of correlation, regression, and factor analysis. In particular, it makes is possible to determine the relationship between the form of government and the consolidation of democracy, i.e. to verify empirically J. Linz's (1990) hypothesis on the "perils" of presidentialism and assess the arguments of his opponents.
Fourth, measuring presidential power provides the ability to track the dynamics of regimes. Focusing on qualitative categories (presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism etc.) means it is extremely difficult to determine in which direction the regime moves. For example, there are difficulties in trying to determine how the form of government in Kyrgyzstan has changed following the "Tulip Revolution" in 2006-2007: Kyrgyzstan under Askar Akayev was semipresidential, and after he was overthrown it has become semi-presidential once again. However, there is no doubt that the relationship between the president, government, and parliament has changed, which can be determined using quantitative methods. 6), and sees his task as determining the level of presidentialism instead of a mere measurement of presidential prerogatives. Krouwel adopts a two-dimensional approach (pure presidentialism and pure parliamentarism) and offers a new method based on measuring the presidential score and parliamentary score. He codes the following seven constitutional elements: election of the head of state; dissolution of parliament; ministerial appointments; vote of investiture before a government takes office; vote of confidence; introduction and veto of legislation; and executive powers. In calculating the presidential score, each variable associated with presidentialism receives the score "1," and each variable that is not a characteristic of presidentialism receives the score "0"; when the powers are shared or limited the score is "0.5" (pp. 16-17) . The presidential score is the sum of the scores for all seven variables of presidentialism, and the parliamentary score is the sum of the scores for all seven variables of parliamentarism. The level of presidentialism is then calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score. A positive score indicates presidentialism, a negative score indicates parliamentarism, and the higher the score, the higher the level of presidentialism (p. 9). For example, according to Krouwel, the level of presidentialism for Russia is "+4.5," for Lithuania "+0.5," for Poland "0.0," for Romania "-2.0," and for the Czech Republic "-4.5."
Krouwel's method is valuable because it allows us to "weigh" the presidential and parliamentary components of any form of government, whether presidential, parliamentary, or semi-presidential. However, it requires modification, as I have done in my previous works (Zaznaev, 2006; Zaznaev, 2007) . In particular, I have amended several variables. I have divided the variable "ministerial appointment" into "appointment of prime minister" and "appointment of ministers," divided "introduction and veto of legislation" into "introduction of legislation" and "veto of legislation," and have excluded Krouwel's "vote of confidence." Finally, I have added two new variables: "compatibility/incompatibility of the position of member of legislature with the government position" and "formation of a new cabinet after the presidential and (or) the parliamentary elections." I eventually proposed ten criteria for measuring different systems, whether presidentialism, parliamentarism, semi-presidentialism, or any other (Zaznaev, 2006, pp. 192-193) . 1 -the head of state/the president holds the executive powers and heads the cabinet (the president's administration) 0.5 -the head of state/the president shares executive powers with the government 0 -the head of state/the president has no executive powers 1 -the executive is the government responsible to parliament 0.5 -the executive powers are shared between the head of state/the president and the government 0 -the government is fully responsible to the head of state/the president C Appointment of prime minister 1 -the head of state/the president appoints the prime minister (or the head of state/the president executes functions of the prime minister) 0.5 -the head of state/the president shares the power to appoint the prime minister with parliament (the coordinated appointment) 0 -the head of state/the president does not affect the appointment of the prime minister (or the head of state/the president is forced to consider the party composition of parliament when appointing the prime minister)
1 -the prime minister is appointed by parliament or the head of state/president who is forced to consider the party composition of parliament 0.5 -parliament shares the power to appoint the prime minister with the head of state/the president (the coordinated appointment) 0 -parliament has no power to influence the appointment of the prime minister As with Krouwel's method, the maximum value for each of the 10 criteria is "1," the minimum is "0," and there is the intermediate variant "0.5." Easy to calculate by summing all 10 criterions, the maximum presidential score (PresS) and parliamentary score (ParlS) may be 10. I suggest that my method of measuring is based on the calculation of the index of the form of government (IFG) (Zaznaev, 2006, p. 194; Zaznaev, 2007, p. 152] , which is calculated by subtracting the parliamentary score from the presidential score:
IFG = PresS -ParlS.
A positive IFG indicates the attraction of a system to presidentialism, and negative its shift to parliamentarism. The higher the numerical value of the index, the greater the presidential elements in a system, the lower the more parliamentary. A zero IFG shows a balance of power. All states are placed on a scale of "-10" to "+10." Therefore, calculating IFG provides opportunities not only for a more accurate estimation of separate systems, but also for comparing them (Zaznaev, 2007, pp. 162-164) . Based on this modified methodology, I calculated the IFG of 22 semipresidential countries in Europe and the former Soviet Union. This allowed me to specify three clusters of such systems: presidentialized (IFG from +10 to +4), balanced (IFG from +3 to -3), and parliamentarized (IFG from -4 to -10) (Zaznaev, 2007, p. 154) . My analysis showed that semi-presidential states of Western, Central, and Eastern Europe are characterized by a shift towards a parliamentary system. In these countries, the leading role is played not by the executive branch headed by the president but by the parliament, and the results of the legislative elections determine the "face" of the regime. Semipresidential republics of the former USSR (except Lithuania, Armenia, and Ukraine, where there have been substantial parliamentary transformations), by contrast, show a tendency for presidentialism and super-strong presidential power. If you look at the constitutional development of semi-presidential states of Europe and the former Soviet Union in recent years, it is easy to distinguish two trends in dynamics -parliamentarization (Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Ukraine) and presidentialization (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia etc.) (Zaznaev, 2007, pp. 160-161) .
Concluding Remarks
Using measurements of presidential power generates a series of questions that must be addressed. Should we consider the formal prerogatives of presidents or informal aspects of presidential authority? Is it necessary to seek the assistance of experts, thus increasing the risk of unreliability? What should the level of measurement be, and what scale of measurement is preferable? Where are the numerical boundaries between strong, moderate, and weak presidencies? Should we take into account the particularities of presidential, parliamentary, and semi-presidential regimes in the measurement? To what extent does the index of presidential power depend on the president's personality, and what differences are there between indexes of presidential power, for example, in Russia under Putin or Medvedev, i.e. how do we measure the dynamics of presidential power?
Quantitative research into forms of government "paves the way" with difficulties. First, skepticism affects academics in the measurement of social phenomena. Second, any measurement is a significant simplification. Therefore, any method of measuring presidential power can be easily criticized as not reflecting the objective reality, or even distorting it. However, despite the difficulties, the measurement of presidential power and the measurement of other components of the legislative-executive relations have gradually offered a perspective on the direction taken in political science.
